By: Kayris Baggett, Jaylon Crisp, Levin Low, Jennifer Tran
The shift from colonial to postcolonial status is generally understood to be punctuated by much violence, suffering, and heartache. Look closer still, and one sees that this autonomy is not as total as implied; the shift is “not so much of independence as of being in-dependence” (Young 2003, 34). Thus, the postcolonial era is typically characterized not by freedom, but by the persistence of colonial power dynamics in more insidious ways which the colonized state is not equipped to oppose. Whether in pursuit of sovereignty, or desperate attempts to retain some level of autonomy under ever-increasing economic and political pressures, the experience of being forced into neo-colonial relationships is devastatingly common among Southeast Asian nation-states. We take a lens to Thailand, Malaysia/Singapore, and Vietnam in order to examine this unending struggle for true independence in the colonial and neo-colonial eras.
Thailand: A Two-Sided Coin
The British made their first intrusions into Siam (now Thailand) in 1855, when King Mongkut was coerced under threat of invasion into signing a treaty that elevated British traders above Siamese law and prevented tariff increases on British goods. Similar treaties were signed with twelve other European countries over the following decades, all sharing two insidious characteristics: they were “irrevocable and eternal” (Sayre 1927). These restrictions on trade and internal agency trapped the Siamese kingdom in a persistent state of semi-coloniality. The succeeding monarch, Chulalongkorn, continued his predecessor’s appeasement policies upon his accession in 1873; he is often credited for Siam’s status as the only Southeast Asian nation to avoid official colonization (Hafner et al. 2005).
However, this is not to say that the nation emerged any more unscathed—indeed, quite the opposite. To preserve Siamese autonomy in the face of mounting tensions with the French and British throughout the mid- to late 1800s, Chulalongkorn was forced to conform to various Western policies, including the ceding of territories within today’s Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia and the payment of millions of francs in reparations (Sayre 1927). This struggle to remain independent, while outwardly successful, has left myriad scars on the Thai nation, as a result of semi-colonial subjugation.
Map of Siamese land cessions: purple = to French, red = to British, yellow = Thailand’s current borders. Source: Wikimedia Commons
However, the unfortunate truth is that Thailand is also a participant in modernized forms of colonialism. The nationalist historiography only tells the story of a victimized and persevering Thai people, concealing the history of the minority to the subaltern. The modernization of Siam involved changes not only in development and culture, but also in ideas of power and universality. The desire for a centralized power and universal national identity emerged, pushing King Chulalongkorn for stricter control over the northeastern and southern provinces which largely contained Lao and Malay ethnic groups (McCargo 2017). An amalgam of eurocentric ideals and Thai identity, an “alternative” form of modernity, was conceived, beginning the systematic rejection of Other ethnic traditions and their forced assimilation into a modernized Thai identity.
As dominance shifted from monarchs to official elites, Thailand’s internal colonialism continues today, with power centralized with the Thai majority. An example is the Thai-appointed Muslim civil courts specifically for the four majority Islamic provinces of Songhkla, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat (Loos 2010). Not unlike the courts made for the indigenous people of traditional colonial practices, the courts are autonomous outside the Malay-Muslim community, giving the centralized Thai population control over the minority under the guise of cultural inclusivity. It is unclear whether the British and French are to blame, but it is apparent that the foundations of Thailand’s ideology is the inheritance of a colonial past.
Thai Muslims call for action following 85 Muslim deaths during the Tak Bai massacre of 2004. Source: Reuters
Malaysia/Singapore
Polarization runs deep in Malaysia, and its main dividing line is ethnic. Malays make up the majority of the population, and Chinese, Indian, and other small indigenous groups do not have equal rights. A racial hierarchy exists, with the Malays sitting at the top.
We can trace this ethnocentrism back to the struggle for independence from British colonial rule. When the British formed the Malayan Union to lay the foundation for a multiracial, independent nation-state, Malay elites mobilized in outrage. Granting equal political and citizenship rights to non-Malays would diminish sultans’ sovereignty, and they formed the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in response. Later, UMNO joined forces with Chinese and Indian parties to form the Alliance, but UMNO still held the reins. This position allowed the Malays to institutionalize their ethnic supremacy; the Malaysian political landscape was built upon racial and identity politics, something that (perhaps directly) contributed to the separation of Singapore.
When Malaysia was first formed, the Chinese majority of Singapore’s population were dissatisfied, to say the least. They protested the discriminatory policies with race riots, bombing, and sedition. Eventually, Singapore was expelled, and they immediately instituted a more authoritative government to begin breaking down the racial class system. Mandating a common language (English) that was not affiliated with any of the major ethnic groups, taking land ownership to build low-income housing, mandating ethnic and income quotas in said housing to prevent ethnic enclaves or “rich and poor neighborhoods,” and adopting an extremely meritocratic approach (especially in education) successfully dismantled old aristocratic systems left behind by the British and inherited by the Malays. The Malaysian experience contrasts deeply with the Singaporean experience in these ways.
Vietnam
A Vietnamese history of colonization through France and, by extension, the American regime, has shaped the country’s economics, especially in terms of its status as a “developing” country in the eyes of the West.
In the late 1940s, the French struggled to assert control over its colonies in Indochina — Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos — despite financial backing from the United States. France promised Vietnam its autonomy by 1949, but with a caveat of French oversight into the country’s defense and foreign policy. Instead, the Viet Minh United Front asserted its role by proclaiming the country’s independence in 1945 (Hack 2012). In 1954, the French-controlled garrison at Điện Biên Phủ fell following a four-month siege conducted by Hồ Chí Minh, a revolutionary in the Việt Minh independence movement. The French pulled out of the region, and in their stead, the United States became committed to countering communist nationalists in the region in fear of political instability. They would not withdraw from Vietnam for another two decades (Dien Bien Phu).
Before French colonization, the Vietnamese economy was mainly agrarian and village-oriented, causing it to be considered “developing” by Western countries. The French designated North Vietnam for manufacturing and South Vietnam for agricultural products, exacerbating regional differences and increasing the importation of French goods. Following the Vietnam War, land redistribution and agricultural collectivism under the Communist Party became key tenets for economic restoration (Bui and Preechametta 2016). War had strained Vietnam’s economy due to resource expenditure and the sheer number of deaths, as well as the exodus of refugees, many of which were skilled laborers and educated peoples. Đổi Mới was a set of notable economic reforms that created a socialist-oriented market economy, introducing more opportunities for market forces to work with enterprises and government agencies, as well as private ownership of small enterprises. This, along with other reforms, helped lift the country from its position as a traditional “developed” country.
Despite the strides Vietnam has taken in improving its economy, the context of colonization remains. In an attempt to push North Vietnam into a peace agreement, Henry Kissinger planned in the 1972 Paris Peace Accords to pay war reparations to Vietnam. Lê Đức Thọ, the head of North Vietnamese delegation, initially suggested $8 billion — $4.5 billion for the North and $3.5 billion for the South (The Forgotten Debt to Vietnam 2000). A draft of the agreement in January 1973 lowered the amount to $3.25 billion over a five-year period, with $1-1.5 billion offered for food and other necessities. Neither the North nor the South respected this agreement, giving the United States an opportunity to back out of reparations. In 1999, the United States offered Vietnam $3 million, but continued to hold Vietnam $145 million in debt that Communist Party of Vietnam inherited when it consolidated with the South. Persisting debt keeps Vietnam in a state of dependence, raising questions of whether Vietnam will ever be able to escape its status as a “developing” country in the view of the West.
Conclusion
With the development of postcolonial theory, we as a society must stay resilient in understanding colonialism’s branching derivations. As Indonesia’s President Sukarno put at the 1955 Bandung Conference,
“Colonialism has also its modern dress… It is a skillful and determined enemy, and appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily.” (Sukarno, 1955).
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